What's new on the tech regulation front for 2002?

In days gone by, the technical regulations governing Formula 1 used to change almost on a whim, with little forward planning: one team would come up with a technological leap forward, other teams would object and the innovation would be banned.

Thankfully, in recent years, under the guidance of the FIA, working in consultation with the teams and major manufacturers, a more structured approach has been adopted to the rule book.

These days, the main parameters governing rule changes are stability, aimed at limiting costs, controlling the speed of the cars and, most importantly, driver and spectator safety.

The increasing use of computers to control just about every aspect of a car's performance has also necessitated rules to simplify legality checks on the cars, or putting it bluntly, to prevent cheating.

The fact that by and large the rules are working can be seen from the fact that regulations for 2002 have hardly changed from the previous year. On the safety front, there are four modifications. The rear ''rain'' light, used in poor visibility is 50% larger than last year. Rear view mirrors are bigger: up from 120 x 50 mm to 150 x 50 mm. There is a new lateral static test for the rear of the car: a force of 4 tons is applied to a 100 x 300 mm area for 30 seconds and no deformation must result from this force.

Tethers designed to prevent wheels flying off the cars in the event of an accident now have to withstand a load of 6 tons, up from 5 and each wheel now requires two tethers.

However, even these seemingly minor changes presented an interesting engineering exercise to the teams, as McLaren International Managing Director Martin Whitmarsh explains. ''The rear push off test was more challenging than we had imagined and, as with most teams, our structure from last year would not have met the requirements,'' he says. ''We shouldn't underestimate what any team has to do to type approve its chassis. The side impact tests in particular are problematic and for the first time, we dedicated a chassis entirely to the type approval process.''

''Historically we have used the first or second chassis to go through the process. But when you see the severity of the impact, even though we replace the energy absorbing structures afterwards, you inevitably have some qualms about that chassis and it becomes the least loved chassis in the collection! That's why we decided to dedicate a chassis for crash testing, with no intention of ever building it into a car. The tests we carry out are severe and a lot of progress has been made in this area, year by year since 1994.''

The tether modifications are designed not only to protect the driver, but also spectators, in an attempt to prevent wheels flying over catch fencing.

''Apart from the demands of the new regulations teams have worked together to find better materials for the tether itself to ensure it now absorbs more energy,'' affirms Whitmarsh. ''All F1 teams have a responsible attitude towards safety, but you have the pressure to build a competitive car, which means you want to meet the requirements in the most efficient manner. How far do you go in making the safest part when it could compromise performance?''

''What we have to remember is that you can never have absolute safety in F1. We have to be prudent in how we talk about safety and promote the good work that has been done. Any racing driver is intelligent enough to realise the level of risk that exists in Formula 1. If you convince drivers they are sitting in an impenetrable structure that can do them no harm, regardless of the size of impact, then they are prepared to go faster, which is good, but they are also prepared to take higher risk. The cars are safe, compared with six or seven years ago and we have to continue to look at the regulations and see how we can improve them.''

At first glance, the banning of electronic power steering might seem a retrograde step, given these systems are commonly fitted on road cars. So Whitmarsh gives us a history lesson to explain the thinking behind the decision.

''Back in the days of active ride, traction control and power steering, when we also had power braking in the early 90s, F1 promoted the fact that these were technical achievements, but there was a fear we were de-skilling the sport and that any driver could drive these cars,'' he explains. ''If you look back to those days, in 93 it was the pinnacle of the driver aids period and Ayrton Senna was driving for us and still managed to demonstrate a material difference in his capability. On the telemetry side we had the advent of fly-by- wire throttle, power braking and steering and technically it was capable of controlling braking steering and throttle from the garage.''

''When these mechanisms were prohibited it was always very easy to check the presence of active ride. But traction control, requiring no mechanical actuation, needed software validation to check for their presence. The FIA made a competent effort to demonstrate they could detect these systems, but nevertheless the general perception was that it could not be policed. Eventually it was re-admitted and the software was freed up. At the same time, it was agreed, as a quid pro quo, that the braking and steering must remain completely under the control of the driver. Given that we are taking away software inspection, we must also take away all means by which software could control braking and steering. This year we had to go to a mechanically based power steering system which could be physically checked and not controlled by software. It was an engineering challenge and from an engineering standpoint, I think our solution is interesting.''

The admission of two way telemetry has sparked suggestions that the cars can be pretty much ''driven'' from the pit-wall, however the reality is rather more straightforward.

''We have freed up software so prohibition of two way telemetry is no longer valid,'' says Whitmarsh. In recent years, the number of buttons and dials on an F1 car's steering wheel has proliferated to the point where there is hardly room to fit any more. They controlled anything from the radio, to brake balance to engine mapping. Engineers studying the computer screens in the garage would advise a driver by radio or pit-board to change a setting, messages would often be misunderstood, leading to confusion and operating buttons is hardly what one thinks of when considering a driver's skill at the wheel. Now, with two-way telemetry, the engineers can for example change engine settings, without detracting from the driver's job of making the car go quicker.''